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COMMENTARY
The Legitimacy Crisis of the U.S. 
Elite and the Rise of Donald Trump
INDERJEET PARMAR*
ABSTRACT The American political elite’s legitimacy crisis is demon-
strated by Trump’s rise by challenging Wall Street, both main par-
ties’ leadership, and limited government. His challenge overlapped 
with Leftist Bernie Sanders’ who also focused on deep inequalities 
in the U.S. The crisis is rooted in the neoliberal political-economic 
model adopted in the 1970s to shore up American elite power but 
which generated major crises at home and challenges abroad. 
Such challenges demand a new ‘grand bargain’ that is unlikely to 
emerge without prolonged domestic political strife and resistance 
to American global power.
“At a certain point in their historical lives, 
social classes become detached from their 
traditional parties. In other words, the tra-
ditional parties in that particular organi-
sational form, with the particular men or 
women who constitute, represent and lead 
them, are no longer recognised by their class 
(or fraction of a class) as its expression. 
When such crises occur, the immediate sit-
uation becomes delicate and dangerous, be-
cause the field is open for violent solutions, 
for the activities of unknown forces, repre-
sented by charismatic ‘men of destiny.’” 
Antonio Gramsci
“Let us wage a moral and political war 
against the billionaires and corporate lead-
ers, on Wall Street and elsewhere, whose 
policies and greed are destroying the middle 
class of America.” 
U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders
Introduction
The rise of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States is symptomatic of a deep crisis 
of American identity and the power 
and hegemony of the ruling class, 
particularly of its market-led global-
ism. American globalism’s corporate 
core-dynamic has produced gross in-
equalities of income and wealth that 
have colonized its political culture 
and institutions. This has produced 
a diversionary but deeply-rooted, 
carefully-nurtured domestic politics 
characterized by class-based ‘plu-
to-populist’ white nationalism.1 Inter-
nationally, there are challenges from 
re-emerging powers from the global 
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South, like China and India, demand-
ing a renegotiation of power in the 
U.S.-led order, and with (rhetorical) 
nationalist-historical narratives of 
humiliation during Western colonial 
rule.2 Conversely, those re-emerging 
powers, and their elites, have grown 
influential within the U.S.-led global-
ist order and therefore sit atop un-
equal and unstable societies, as they 
rapidly industrialize and urbanize. 
Finally, the United States and Europe 
face refugee/migration crises partly 
spawned by U.S.-led military inter-
ventions in the Middle East resulting 
in blowback terrorism and ISIS in-
surgency.3 America’s population ap-
pears to have less appetite for external 
interventions and global hegemony 
and are polarized on the fundamental 
question of what America stands for.4 
The American elite’s legitimacy cri-
sis is multisided and deep, at home 
and abroad. The Trump presidency 
is unlikely to resolve it due to its di-
visive, nationalistic, “America First” 
character, despite the administra-
tion's reversal of headline attacks 
on the U.S.-led international order. 
The Democratic Party opposition, 
with the corporate media, intelli-
gence/military services, and elite 
think tanks, by its side, appears to 
be continuing its ‘centrist’ status quo 
political strategy as the best way to 
defeat Trump in 2020. It is still tied 
to Wall Street donors, and a series 
of investigations around alleged col-
lusion between the Trump election 
campaign and the Russian state to 
defeat Hillary Clinton in Novem-
ber 2016.5 Meanwhile, Trump’s cab-
inet of billionaires plans to abolish 
what remains of social safety nets 
for the most vulnerable in American 
society, reduce spending on envi-
ronmental regulation, deregulating 
healthcare, banks, and other major 
corporate sectors, and weaken labor 
protections. Proposed tax cuts to the 
very richest suggest inequality is set 
to continue or increase, exacerbat-
ing the legitimacy crisis as Trump’s 
economic nationalist program fails 
to deliver well-paid jobs to enough 
workers in the “rust belt” states who 
propelled him to the presidency.6
Should the above scenario material-
ize, the United States should expect 
major political and social unrest, a 
significant part of which will be ra-
cialized and/or ‘Islamophobic’ in 
character. This is, at its core, a racial-
ized class-based politics mobilized by 
the right that divides society and pre-
vents the formation of a unified re-
form strategy to shift income, wealth 
and power away from the billionaire 
class or establishment towards the 
“99 percent.”7
The Democratic Party 
opposition, with the corporate 
media, intelligence/military 
services, and elite think tanks, 
by its side, appears to be 
continuing its ‘centrist’ status 
quo political strategy as the 
best way to defeat Trump in 
2020
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Democratic 
presidential 
candidate Bernie 
Sanders delivers 
a major policy 
address on Wall 
Street reform 
in New York on 
January 5, 2016.
AFP PHOTO /  
KENA BETANCUR
The biggest challenge facing the 
U.S.-led liberal international order 
is to genuinely embrace diversity at 
home and abroad and strategies to 
reduce class inequality. The problem, 
however, is that the maintenance of 
dominant class economic-financial 
interests and elite political power 
is implicated in racialized politics. 
Liberal politics professes a greater 
attachment to diversity but remains 
racialized at heart; its attachment to 
diversity is but a thin veneer shroud-
ing the continuation of racialized 
class-based inequality on a large 
scale, even as highly talented minori-
ties ‘make it.’8 On the right, diversity 
remains a distant secondary goal to 
‘color blind’ equality of opportunity, 
obscuring large-scale racial dis-
crimination and maintenance of a 
racialized class system.9 Indeed, the 
Republican right has been reversing 
African-Americans’ civil rights era 
voting rights.10 Liberals and right 
wingers therefore work effectively in 
tandem to reproduce a hierarchical 
racial-class system at home –until 
recently a system of “racism without 
racists”11– dovetailing with America’s 
approach to global South emerging 
powers.12 
Race is the available politically-sa-
lient fault line nurtured and exploited 
to maintain the power and influ-
ence of an oligarchy of wealth in the 
United States. In the current period, 
racial politics works specifically by 
dividing predominantly white voters 
from the “outsider” –the minority, 
the refugee, Muslim, the illegal im-
migrant– who allegedly leech off the 
welfare system, taxpayers’ generosity, 
and hate America’s values. In this sce-
nario, it is white Americans who are 
the most racially-disadvantaged, an 
anxiety and anger long exploited by 
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the Republican Party and pandered 
to by the Democrats.13 In certain 
terms, the same or similar is consid-
ered true of America’s allies –“taking 
advantage” of U.S. military resources 
and goodwill while refusing to pay 
their fair shares, while rising com-
petitor states like China manipulate 
their currency, “dump” cheap steel 
onto the American market, and take 
American jobs.14 
Trump’s pluto-populism (billion-
aire-led calls to the masses to rise up 
against the political establishment) 
is the most overtly racialized class 
politics since the 1960s –its politi-
cal message of “America First,” “tak-
ing America back,” making it “great 
again” wrapped up in an openly rac-
ist Islamophobia speaks to a sense of 
white loss and yearning for a golden 
age. Such a divisive message is, how-
ever, a major roadblock to domestic 
stability as it generates mass opposi-
tion as well as judicial intervention to 
overturn unconstitutional executive 
orders. It not only fails to address, 
but is part of, the economic prob-
lem at the heart of the body politic 
–economic inequality and polariza-
tion alongside a politics dominated 
by big money that sets agendas that 
are narrow, market-oriented and fa-
vor low taxes and small government. 
Abroad, it means continued prob-
lems in accepting emerging powers 
as equals in the international system, 
with attendant political difficulties, 
and the continuation of racialized 
warfare across parts of the non-white 
world.15
Legitimacy Crisis
The legitimacy crisis of America’s po-
litical-economic elites is deep, clear, 
serious, likely to last, and likely to fea-
ture significant political strife unless 
elite politics is reformed to loosen 
the power of big money16 and open 
up political agendas to encompass 
significant political and economic 
reform. Unfortunately, as historian 
Howard Zinn pointed out, political 
change in America takes large-scale, 
widespread and prolonged political 
turmoil and usually violence to ef-
fect.17 In addition, signals from the 
main opposition Democratic Party 
as to readiness to lead such an effort 
at political reform are discouraging.18 
Yet, signs of mass alienation and dis-
content seem quite clear.19
Robert Reich tells a story of a book 
tour of the ‘flyover states’ –the places 
between the American East and West 
The legitimacy crisis of 
America’s political-economic 
elites is deep, clear, serious, 
likely to last, and likely to 
feature significant political 
strife unless elite politics 
is reformed to loosen the 
power of big money and 
open up political agendas to 
encompass significant political 
and economic reform
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coasts that liberals fear to tread and 
are dominated by rock-ribbed Re-
publicans– in the summer of 2015. 
His experience was instructive: the 
liberal academic and former Secre-
tary of Labor to President Clinton 
found to his shock that hard core 
GOP voters were outraged by the po-
litical leadership of both main polit-
ical parties and wanted to throw out 
the political establishment in Wash-
ington D.C. They had had enough of 
the corrupt politics of the political 
leadership of the United States and 
their rich corporate donors.20 
Bernie Sanders’ primary election 
campaign garnered 13 million votes 
–for an overtly socialist program 
aimed at gutting the power of Wall 
Street, and implicated the Demo-
cratic National Committee’s pre-
ferred candidate with the politics of 
the establishment and the billionaire 
class. He openly endorsed a politics 
of class conflict that pitted the billion-
aire class against the vast majority of 
working and middle class Americans 
in a society that was deeply unequal 
and wedded to the politics of the dol-
lar rather than satisfying Americans’ 
aspirations for fair reward for hard 
work, healthcare for all, adequate in-
vestment in American infrastructure, 
and a college education that would 
not leave graduates in massive debt.21 
Not since Eugene Debs ran for the 
Socialist Party in 1912 and 1920 –
when he won almost 2 million votes 
in total– has a socialist candidate 
generated so much support in the 
United States. Sanders lost the pri-
maries, of course, but it was clear that 
the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) conspired to favor Clinton 
via the super-delegates system that 
almost guaranteed a Clinton victory. 
In addition, both main candidates 
were aided by a corporate-dominated 
media which provided dispropor-
tionately less airtime to the socialist 
candidate as compared to Clinton 
and Trump (the latter won 13 mil-
lion primary votes in the Republican 
contest). Finally, it was also clear that 
the New York Times, Washington Post 
and other media outlets of the liberal 
establishment sided with Clinton in 
undermining the Sanders campaign 
and dismissing his economic policy 
as deeply flawed and bound to fail.22
Hillary Clinton’s own public stand-
ing was poor throughout the elec-
tion campaign, just ahead of the 
public approval levels of Donald 
Trump. Trump was the most nega-
tively viewed presidential candidate 
in Americans’ eyes but Clinton came 
a close second. The choice before the 
people in November 2016 was there-
fore between the lesser of two evils.23
In office, President Trump’s approval 
ratings are among the lowest recorded 
at so early a stage of an administra-
tion –hovering around a mere 40 per-
cent. There has been no ‘honeymoon’ 
for President Trump,24 so divisive 
was his campaign and promulgation 
of executive orders to ban Muslims 
from several countries from entering 
the United States, amongst other re-
gressive actions.
On the other hand, the Democratic 
Party’s approval ratings also remain 
low in the wake of the election of for-
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mer Labor Secretary Tom Perez to 
DNC chair and the decision to lift the 
ban on Wall Street donations to the 
DNC.25 
Conversely, there are major moves 
afoot to recast U.S. politics follow-
ing Senator Bernie Sanders’ unex-
pected successes.26 The movement has 
sprouted a Sanders Institute to mobi-
lize progressive congressional can-
didates across the U.S. According to 
Sanders, candidates may get support 
in fundraising and hustings, even if 
they happen to be progressives from 
the Tea Party. Former Labor Secretary 
Robert Reich has spoken of a new 
progressive party –the kind of orga-
nizations that are now in motion may 
well lead to such an outcome.27
The Sanders Institute’s aim is to con-
duct political-ideological work on 
the key issues of power, wealth and 
inequality that struck a chord during 
his bid for the Democratic nomina-
tion. Although he has not endorsed 
it, some of his supporters are also 
actively aligning their work with the 
Green Party, which previously asked 
Sanders to run for the White House 
on their ticket. Its candidate, Jill 
Stein, hovered around 5 percent in 
presidential election polls.28
Brand New Congress is another key 
group from the Sanders wing of the 
Democratic Party. It is a political ac-
tion committee that aims to identify 
and support hundreds of non-politi-
cian candidates for over 400 congres-
sional seats with the aim of replacing 
the entire House by the mid-term 
elections in 2018. Formed in April 
2016, in a matter of weeks it raised 
nearly $100,000 in small donations 
and is looking to the future –without 
Wall Street big money politics.29 It 
complements the Sanders Institute’s 
plan to back 100 progressive candi-
dates in congressional, state and local 
elections in November 2016.
Similarly, Sanders’ Our Revolution 
organization aims to build on his 
campaign and revitalize democ-
racy, empower progressives to run 
for school board elections, mayoral 
offices and take on big money pol-
itics. It also seeks to “elevate politi-
cal consciousness,” take on the cor-
porate media, educate the public 
and improve public discourse and 
understanding.30
Trump’s non-conservative statist mes-
sage and campaign rhetoric along 
with Clinton’s ‘shift’ to the left showed 
that there are big changes afoot in the 
fabric of American politics.31 Even 
Wall Street now agrees that wages 
must rise, infrastructure needs invest-
Major shifts in American 
politics, its global strategies, 
economy and political 
culture, occurred in the 
1970s which, in combination, 
constructed the atmosphere 
and issues that propelled 
Donald Trump to the White 
House in 2016
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ment and inequality has reached ex-
treme levels.
Nevertheless, these are early days and 
no political outcome is certain. There 
is much going on, but there is no re-
turning to normalcy after 2016. The 
major trends of 2016 emerged out of 
longer term developments that had 
increasingly alienated Americans and 
manifested in insurgencies from both 
left and right –most prominently in 
the form of the Tea Party and Occupy 
Wall Street movements.32 Both move-
ments expressed deeply held frustra-
tions with their respective party lead-
ers, gathering pace with the election 
of Barack Obama in 2008, the fallout 
of the Iraq war and the post 9/11 war 
on terror, the financial meltdown of 
2008, and the continuing problem 
of inequality amid the politics of af-
fluence funded by a tiny minority of 
large donors.33
A 1970s Moment, but Worse
America has been in a place like this 
before –in the 1970s, but this time it’s 
worse; 2016 represents a key tipping 
point that has been decades in the 
making. In 1974, Harvard’s Samuel P. 
Huntington diagnosed a “crisis of de-
mocracy” that had overtaken Amer-
ica in the 1960s, unleashing demands 
for “democratic surge and… demo-
cratic egalitarianism.” Opposition to 
the Vietnam War, movements for ra-
cial and gender equality, against polit-
ical and governmental corruption led 
people to question the system of gov-
ernment including the “legitimacy 
of hierarchy, coercion, discipline, se-
crecy, and deception –all of which… 
are inescapable attributes of the pro-
cess of government.” Too many peo-
ple who had previously expected little 
from government –blacks, women, 
and students– were demanding op-
U.S. President 
Donald Trump 
standing alone 
during one of the 
working sessions 
of the G20 summit 
in Hamburg on 
July 8, 2017.
AFP PHOTO / POOL / 
MARKUS SCHREIBER
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portunities and privileges previously 
denied to them. There was an “excess 
of democracy” rather than the usual, 
and necessary, rule of a few men from 
Wall Street law firms and banks, me-
dia and foundations. Participatory 
democracy, to Huntington, appeared 
as chaos and disorder.34 
Major shifts in American politics, its 
global strategies, economy and po-
litical culture, occurred in the 1970s 
which, in combination, constructed 
the atmosphere and issues that pro-
pelled Donald Trump to the White 
House in 2016. At home, corporate 
counter-mobilizations re-established 
the ideas and politics of free enterprise 
as the backbone of America, seen in 
myriad ways –in the rise of new right 
think tanks like Heritage Foundation, 
funded by corporate foundations like 
Coors, corporate funding of the main 
political parties as their battles inten-
sified and, eventually the rise of a con-
servative establishment rivalling the 
‘liberal’ establishment by the 1990s.35 
Allied shifts towards a consumer 
culture fueled by cheap money and 
debt, and the rise of women workers, 
masked the actual stagnation of real 
wages from the mid-1970s and be-
yond. Standards of living improved 
but people were spending future 
earnings in an economy that was 
heading towards deindustrialization 
or post-industrialism partly by de-
sign and partly by basic technological 
development.36 
The 1960s ‘rights revolution’ estab-
lished the Democrats as the party of 
minorities –women and blacks– and 
the GOP as the new home of erstwhile 
white working/middle class male 
Democrats. The latter made their 
voices heard with a landslide victory 
for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and three 
consecutive defeats for the Demo-
crats. By the early 1990’s, a profound 
reorientation of the Democratic Party 
towards the Clintonite third way was 
well underway including a fundamen-
tal rejection of the New Deal order. 
The ‘angry white male’ besieged by 
independent women, assertive racial 
minorities, “politically-correct” lan-
guage, and a sense of loss of a 1950s 
America, in which they occupied the 
apex of America, traces his (re)birth 
to the 1970s.37 
Cementing that position was the 
radically changed position of the 
1970’s U.S. in the world: defeated in 
Vietnam, unable/unwilling to inde-
pendently to exert dollar domination, 
a loosening of post-1945 relationships 
with more assertive Japan and West-
ern Europe, forcing détente with the 
Soviet Union, facing the OPEC oil cri-
A new “grand bargain” at home 
and abroad that rebalances 
economy and politics away 
from the power of Wall Street 
and big money may be 
required; one that redraws the 
character of America’s global 
engagement towards a more 
realistic assessment of its power 
and role in a changing world
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sis, and a collective demand from the 
‘third world’ for a New International 
Economic Order.38 Huntington’s crisis 
of democracy at home was twinned 
with a crisis of American authority 
on the global stage. The response, in 
part, to the latter was of long-term 
significance –globally and at home. A 
long-term ‘solution,’ to be sure, which 
brought us to where we are today.
The Third World, it was argued, was 
really not homogeneous; there was 
an aspirational ‘middle class’ part of 
that world that could be brought into 
the U.S.-led liberal order through 
investment and loans. This merely 
played into current trends of global-
ization of the U.S. economy and the 
export of capital and manufacturing 
to the middle class third world –In-
dia, Mexico, Turkey, Venezuela, and 
later China, not to mention the East 
Asian tiger economies.39
The net effect was that white workers 
and their middle class counterparts 
turned their backs on the Democrats 
and were psychologically assuaged in 
their new home –the GOP as the ‘white 
man’s party’– but received little in the 
way of benefits from low taxes and 
small government. In reality, the latter 
formulation was a reaction to and tar-
geted at the poor and minorities, but it 
impacted on so-called ‘rust belt’ states 
–Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, 
and West Virginia. The globalized free 
market and the corporations that fed 
the new right’s ideology chased profits 
by opening new territories across the 
world –in low wage economies. Ship-
building, coal mines, steel factories, 
auto manufacturers were among the 
sectors of the economy that witnessed 
the export of jobs, plant and machin-
ery, as well as their migration within 
the United States, to neighbors, for 
example, across the border in the ma-
quiladora economy.40 
The decline of organized labor and 
the inexorable rise of financial elite 
power over state and economy had 
profound effects on political culture, 
institutions, policy and agendas.41 
Consumption through debt and 
money making money, drove grow-
ing inequality of income and wealth 
from the mid-1970s,42 bled into party 
politics through big money and into 
the very halls of power, alienating 
masses of people from the political 
and economic order.
Yet, despite these seismic changes 
in the terrain of American politics, 
economy and society, economic 
growth in the 1980s and 1990s –fu-
eled by consumer debt– managed 
to keep a lid on discontents. But the 
twenty-first century has seen the re-
sults come home to roost –fueled by 
the effects of the Iraq war, the war on 
terror and the 2008 financial crisis.43
Yet, the conservative political-ideo-
logical mix of low taxes and federal 
social spending cuts delivered very 
little to working class whites, African 
Americans –middle class or working 
class– or other minorities. Income 
and wealth inequality44 grew rapidly 
as Wall Street bankers amassed greater 
fortunes and increasingly bankrolled 
election spending by both main polit-
ical parties, set political agendas and 
further reinforced the disconnect 
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between the electorate and political 
power.45 The financial crash of 2008 
produced federal bailouts and rescue 
packages for major banks to the tune 
of trillions of dollars but little by way 
of relief for ordinary people. The Tea 
Party and Occupy Wall Street were 
major responses from left and right 
signaling a legitimacy crisis that nei-
ther party heeded; Trump and Sand-
ers, and the defeat of Hillary Clinton, 
was their political manifestation in 
2016. The seeds of the present crisis 
were sown in the 1970s and have now 
borne bitter fruit. 
Conclusion: What Now?
A new “grand bargain” at home and 
abroad that rebalances economy 
and politics away from the power of 
Wall Street and big money may be 
required; one that redraws the char-
acter of America’s global engagement 
towards a more realistic assessment 
of its power and role in a changing 
world. Trump and Sanders are not 
only the symptoms of a crisis; hid-
den in their core appeal and message 
lies a beta test of a political cure. And 
the core of it is a new kind of politics 
based on grassroots mobilizations 
around economic, financial and the 
role of the U.S. in world issues.46 Those 
matters have become so tightly held 
in the grip of America’s political elites 
–Republican and Democratic bipar-
tisanship– with attendant benefits of 
wealth, privilege and power to the few, 
that the voices of ordinary voters have 
been stymied.47 The mantra of ‘there 
is no alternative’ to the free market 
or big money domination of poli-
tics, or the belief in militarily-fueled 
U.S. global primacy, has been heav-
ily damaged from left and right. This 
lack of credibility impacted Hillary 
Clinton’s platform and campaign, sig-
naling a new normal in U.S. politics. 
November 2016 cannot inaugurate 
any ‘return to normalcy’ that ignores 
the Trump and Sanders phenomenon. 
Centrist policies in American politics 
–as a viable political or governing 
strategy– have been narrowed to the 
point of potential extinction. 
But are American political and eco-
nomic elites up to the challenges of 
change? After all, they are the very 
people whose leadership has brought 
their country, and the world, to this 
point. 
Change in America has never been 
easy or gradual; it has usually fol-
lowed serious violence. The United 
States was born in violent revolution, 
The Tea Party and Occupy Wall 
Street were major responses 
from left and right signaling a 
legitimacy crisis that neither 
party heeded; Trump and 
Sanders, and the defeat of 
Hillary Clinton, was their 
political manifestation in 2016. 
The seeds of the present crisis 
were sown in the 1970s and 
have now borne bitter fruit
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waged wars against Native Amer-
icans, enslaved Africans, fought a 
bloody civil war a few decades later, 
and witnessed bloody labor strug-
gles for union rights and higher pay, 
and state and corporate repression 
of anti-war radicals and reformers 
of various stripes. It is a myth that 
real change has been peacefully won 
through mere political lobbying of 
Congress or democratic elections. 
Real change has come as a result of 
massive political resistance against in-
justice and for workers, women’s and 
minority rights, often met with state 
and private vigilante violence which 
ultimately altered the environment 
within which political leaders oper-
ated and fundamentally shifted party 
politics.48 Non-violent direct action 
mobilizations like Black Lives Matter, 
Occupy Wall Street, the Tea Party, the 
‘Battle in Seattle’ against globaliza-
tion; movements like Democracy for 
America, feminist, anti-war and labor 
organizations –these are most likely 
to bring about the conditions of real 
change. Movements like these may 
well be the ones to, force shifts in the 
nature and objects of politics, and the 
established party system and dealing 
with the master problem of inequal-
ity of income, wealth and power. The 
old categories of left and right have 
been rendered almost meaningless 
as Democrats and Republicans com-
plain about core issues: globalization’s 
effects on high-paying industrial jobs, 
anxieties about ever-increasing com-
petition and future prospects, free 
trade, low taxes for the rich, rampant 
corporate power in economy and 
politics, expensive health care, and a 
feeling of loss –of prospects of ever 
achieving the ‘American dream’ itself. 
Ultimately, the sources of political 
and economic change lie in mass 
Trump speaking 
on the phone in 
the Oval Office, 
alongside Chief 
Strategist Steve 
Bannon and 
former National 
Security Advisor 
Michael Flynn.
AFP PHOTO / 
MANDEL NGAN
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protest alongside the production of 
reform backed by new ideas and al-
liances that shift power away from 
moneyed interests towards the peo-
ple. If established elites, with Trump 
in the White House, will not embrace 
the need to reform the system, despite 
rising mass discontent, the United 
States may well experience a period 
of political violence and disorder that 
dwarfs the tumultuous sixties upris-
ings of the civil, women’s and anti-war 
movements. The difference next time 
will be stark, however. The 1960s in-
augurated extensions of democracy 
and rights to minorities excluded by 
race, gender and class. The “fire next 
time” appears to be arising between 
those who want a return to a golden 
age when white, male power ruled 
supreme, against an America that 
wants an open, diverse and egalitar-
ian. The current leadership and line 
of the two main parties is in crisis and 
will continue to be deeply affected by 
the developing legitimacy crisis, un-
less they adapt and renew. Unfortu-
nately, current establishment politics 
appears unable to envision anything 
other than the restoration of the pre-
Trump era and a return to normalcy 
that seems increasingly unlikely. 
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